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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to explore the determinants of terrorist unexpected events and if 
these events can affect economic markets. Based on the existing literature and the 
methodologies already been used, our purpose is to draw some attention to specific 
events, which may create losses to investors or even to countries. Specifically, after a 
thoughtful consideration of the existing relative studies, we discuss a number of empirical 
findings concerning the main determinants of terrorism. In particular, religions and 
especially fanatics is the most common determinant followed by the economic 
perspective of an attack. We show that the more democratic and developed countries are 
inclined to decrease the spread on the returns. Relying on these empirical findings, we 
discuss the implied policy implications and the necessary further research. 
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1. Introduction 
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon (Carter et al., 1998). Economic analysis and 
consequences of terrorism have attracted significant and continuous research interest. 
Apart from human life losses, the victims of terrorist attacks suffer from fear of brutal 
violence and immense number of injuries, which may lead to a number of associated 
indirect costs. These costs are not easily countable and refer to immense amount of 
resources necessary to protect against terrorism or to the instant harms and losses of 
property and capital stock caused by a terrorist attack. Terrorist actions may negatively 
affect many economic and social activities like among others flows of FDI, tourism, and 
economic uncertainty and stock markets with reductions in firms' expected profits.  
As it is well known and accepted, rational investors are by their nature risk averters. 
This means that they prefer safe investments that will not put their capital into risk. On 
the other hand, what characterizes markets is uncertainty. The reasoning that high risks 
lead to high returns and basically to high profits is what predominates in either capital or 
bond markets. Therefore, hedging is the tool that comes to fill the gap between risk 
adverse investors and markets’ uncertainty. In that way, investors can secure themselves 
for changes in interest rates, exchange rates or even share price changes by using future 
or option products.   
However, the question is how they will secure their investments against unexpected 
events. The main issue in that case is that no one can predict the exact time or place or 
whether an unexpected event is going to occur or not. Many people assume that some 
events like weather outbreaks are predictable while there are some cases such as terrorist 
attacks that are not probably predictable. Among others, Kollias et al. (2011a) using event 
study and GARCH models explore the influence of the terrorist attacks in Madrid (11th 
March 2004) and in London (7th July 2005) and the effect of these attacks on equity 
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sectors. They find significant negative abnormal returns only in Spain but with a much 
quicker market rebound in London compared to the Spanish markets where attackers 
were not suicide bombers. Similarly, Kollias et al. (2011b) considered whether market 
reaction (depending on either targets’ type or attacks’ perpetrators) to terrorism has been 
altered diachronically and if market size and its maturity establish reactions. They 
consider the London and Athens stock exchange capitalization markets and using an 
event study methodology and conditional volatility models they find empirical evidence 
that size and maturity together with specific attributes of terrorist incidents are probable 
determinants of markets' reactions. 
In this paper, we focus on whether there is a linkage between terrorist attacks and 
specific determinants such as geographic position, religion, and government system and 
of course the period. Specifically, we consider the theoretical and empirical framework of 
this specific issue. Following the occurrence of these events, market reactions are 
expected to be negative due to the unforeseen happenings causing opposite effects on 
firms and economies. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents relative previous research 
studies examining the purposes of these papers, the applied methodologies and their main 
empirical findings. Section 3 presents the data used in our research effort together with 
their graphical and statistical presentations. Section 4 presents an event study and 
discusses the main findings on this analysis. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper and 
proposes further research steps.  
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2. Literature Review 
2.1   The Purpose 
Tavares (2004), apart from the examination of stock returns, investigates the main 
determinants causing terrorism. The risk of terrorism is higher in comparison to other 
catastrophes, because is driven by both intelligence and intent. Intelligence is a factor 
excluded from natural unexpected catastrophes and intent is a factor excluded from 
industrial disasters. This makes terrorist attacks more dangerous compared to other 
catastrophes (Major, 2002). However, that situation may become even worse when the 
main weapon of terrorism is any kind of biological agent. A terrorist may use a pathogen 
due to the fact that this element may not be easily detected as a potential threat. As a 
consequence, the pathogen will have the adequate time to spread so as to be presented as 
a natural disease and not as a bioterrorist attack (Dembek, 2005). Since no one can 
accurately answer the question whether each disease was caused naturally or was a 
bioterrorist attack, the available data for bioterrorism is in fact narrow.  
From another perspective, Frey et al. (2004) investigated the terrorist attacks and 
the different aspects that have influenced not only the market but also the associated 
economic impact. Their analysis provides evidence that a terrorist attack may have an 
outcome to eight different aspects, such as tourism, investments as well as foreign direct 
investments, savings and consumption, foreign trade, urban economy, national income 
and growth and of course stock markets. This analysis provides an integrated view of the 
outcomes that a terrorist attack may have.  
Considering the purpose per region, the terrorist attacks on the USA embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania inspired Carter et al. (1998) in their research. Although USA 
supports the belief that they are prepared for any terrorist attack, because terrorism for 
them is a serious matter, Carter et al (1998) proved that USA is not prepared enough to 
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face such events especially when the events have as a target the government, services or 
embassies.  
On these lines, the terrorist attack that inspired a great amount of researchers is 
the 11th of September 2001, which shocked the whole world. Charles and Darné (2006) 
examined whether this attack had a temporary or a more permanent consequence due to 
the huge economic result that has been caused. On the other hand, Bhattarai et al. (2005) 
investigated the results of the same terrorist attack on September 11, but not in the USA, 
which is the region mainly affected but Nepal, which has as a main industry the 
adventure tourism, and the main source of tourist is from developed countries and 
especially from the United States. 
Krueger and Malečková (2003) are also inspired by the September 11 but they 
tried to examine the event from the educational and economic perspectives. Their 
purpose was to suggest if there is any linkage to an attack with the educational level of 
the perpetrators including also in their research the economic viewpoint by analysing the 
perpetrators’ and not the victims’ economic status.   
Hausken (2016), based on the 11/9/2001 terrorist attack in the USA and following 
the proposed methodology used by Steward and Mueller (2013), establishes a cost benefit 
analysis of terrorist attack, in which three main costs are included. The first element 
refers to the human cost, including any suicide attack, the second element refers to the 
economic cost and it deals with the required funds for each attack, while the third element 
refers to the influence cost for the targets, which is considered as benefit for the assaulter. 
Initially, the model is introducing a time discount factor, as well as a risk parameter, 
which includes all possible risk cases such as risk aversion, risk neutrality and risk 
seeking. In addition, the generalization of the models permits a multiple stakeholders’ 
impact to the terrorist organizations, which leads to different weights in each analysis. 
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Rosoff and John (2009) used a simulation model with terrorist perspectives’ 
proxies, while Shubik and Zelinsky (2003) introduced a new metric relationship. This 
relationship represented the linkage between the target and the assaulter and was called 
Terrorist Damage Exchange Rate. Buesa et al. (2007) studied the aftermath of the March 
11 2004 terrorist attack in Madrid by evaluating the direct economic costs, while 
considering that human catastrophic consequences will follow. In an attempt to assess 
various counterterrorism procedures, Sandler et al. (2009, 2011) calculated the values of 
lives and casualties based on an average terrorist attack. On the other hand, Brandt and 
Sandler (2010) clarified the way terrorists justify the costs and benefits by adjusting the 
targets. 
Consider the purpose per decade we may say that although authors attempted to 
include previous research based on per year attacks, nothing was fount. Therefore, to our 
knowledge, there is no research trying to conclude whether the frequency of attacks has 
significantly changed in recent years compared to the past.  
Similarly and in terms of the analysis per religion, Jones (2006) focused his 
research specifically on religious terrorist attacks. His research is a theoretical 
psychoanalytic approach and attempts to analyse the main psychological perspectives that 
underlie the attacks guided by religious groups. He also tried to search if there are 
specific religious groups that are more prone to commit such crimes.  
Another usual question is why terrorism occurs. More specifically, a number of 
researchers wonder which system of government is the most dangerous as a target. There 
is a great conflict on whether democracy tends to be the main target for a terrorist attack 
both from the inside of the country and also from the outside the borders. Brynjar and 
Skjølberg (2000) raised this question and attempted to answer it.  
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2.2 Methodologies used in the empirical applications 
Event study analysis is the most commonly used methodology in investigating 
unexpected events (Eckbo et al, 1990; Prabhala, 1997; Maloney and Mulherin, 2002; 
Chen and Siems, 2004; Gaspar et al. 2005; Karolyi and Martell, 2006; Charles and Darné, 
2006; Walker et al., 2006; Ambec and Lanoie, 2008; Arin et al., 2008; Brounrn and 
Derwall, 2010; Carpentier and Suret, 2015). What differs between these studies is the 
range of the event window. Some researchers use a 10-days range of the event window 
basically when they want to examine the immediate and short-term impact (Charles and 
Darné, 2006) while some other prefer a longer range of the event window such as 
Carpentier and Suret (2015) who extended the event window up to a year due to the fact 
that investors have the power to pressure the management in the long-run so they do not 
prefer to sell over the night.  
Apart from event study analysis that has already been mentioned, Bollerslev (1986) 
introduced the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) 
model, which appeared not to be the best approach due to the fact that the estimated 
residuals of that model continue to have excess kurtosis as proved by Baillie and 
Bollerslev (1989) and Teräsvirta (1996). Many researchers have attempted to give an 
explanation to that problem concluding that GARCH models are not able to apprehend 
outliers (Balke and Fomby, 1994; Fiorentini and Maravall, 1996).  For the outlier 
detection, Charles and Darné (2006) applied ARIMA models.  What is also mentioned in 
this paper are two methods that are commonly used by researchers. Time Series 
Regression with ARIMA Noise, Missing Observations and Outliers (TRAMO) used by 
Franses and Haldrup (1994), Lo and Chan (2000), Tolvi (2001), Charles (2004), Darné 
and Diebolt (2004) is the first method while Bradley and Jansen (1995) used methods like 
autoregressive, moving average, ARMA and ARIMA described by Tsay (1998).  
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Tavares (2004) determined the main factors influencing terrorism. For that reason, he 
applied a simple linear regression where the explanatory variables were all those factors 
that, based on the researcher, could influence the terrorist attacks.  In a different manner, 
Major (2002) included game theory, search theory and specialized areas on statistics in 
his analysis due to the fact that he proposed we need more than a probability when 
discussing terrorism because of factors such as intelligence and intent.  
Corrado (1989) developed a non-parametric methodology due to non-normality. Cam 
(2006), Ramiah et al. (2007) and Hallahan et al. (2016) used this methodology. 
Obviously, something that is unexpected cannot follow the normal distribution. Hamilton 
and Hamilton (1983), in one of the initial papers using dynamic models, suggested a class 
of stochastic models in order to prove there are arguments on the terrorism and further 
impacts. Moving forward, Cauley and Im (1988) exerted the intervention analysis, which 
is actually an interrupted time series analysis to examine how effective the security 
measures can be. Based on these, Enders and Sandler (1993) upgraded this approach by 
adding in the analysis the Vector Autoregressive Models.   
Paté-Cornell and Guikema (2002), Frey et al. (2004), Dembek (2005) and Okuyama 
(2007) introduced various advanced techniques. Paté-Cornell and Guikema (2002) based 
their analysis on different scenarios. They have used opt system analysis and probabilistic 
approach. Dembek (2005) also used a similar method with a variety of scenarios. Both of 
these researches have investigated bioterrorism. Paté-Cornell and Guikema (2002) 
emphasize that when using probabilistic approaches to bioterrorism the expected biases 
and errors due to the limited data availability are minimized.  On the other hand, Dembek 
(2005) applied the probable scenarios as an attempt to make future predictions about the 
biological terrorist attacks.  
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Moving forward, Frey et al. (2004) initially analyzed the traditional methods used in 
order to calculate the costs of terrorism and then proposed a new method that is not only 
based on valuation and market. The new method takes into consideration the life 
satisfaction dimension. Specifically, the two traditional methods are the stated preference 
and the revealed preference methods. When using the prior method, researchers are 
usually operating the contingent valuation method while for the revealed preference 
method the commonly used one is the hedonic market approach. The new approach (Frey 
et al., 2004) is, as already mentioned, based on life satisfaction and aims to value the 
psychological impact on humans and not just the economic and market impacts.  
On the top of the advanced methods are those mentioned in Okuyama (2007). This 
paper analyzes the benefits and drawbacks of each method. The Input–Output (I/O) 
method is the most commonly used when examining terrorist attacks and natural 
disasters. Similarly, with Social Accounting Matrices (SAM) method, I/O aims to provide 
upper bounds when analyzing the economic impact of the terrorist attacks and natural 
disasters. In contrast with I/O, Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) is non-linear 
model that can estimate a long-term equilibrium; however, it is a method generally 
underestimating the economic impact of these events. General Econometric Models may 
provide stochastic estimates as well as the ability to make future forecast but the main 
drawback is the fact that a massive dataset is required in order to have accurate 
estimations.   
Based on Okuyama (2007) there are two aspects that may influence the estimations 
and even lead to models that are more specific. These two aspects are time and 
geographical space. The time of these events in duration and consequences may range 
from 30 seconds to few months, in a worst-case scenario. On the other hand, most – if not 
all - of the economic indices are reported in an annual base. When using a static 
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approach, the estimation cannot capture the significance of the event due to the short time 
span of that disaster, which usually leads to insignificant total impact estimations in the 
end. In order to make those models applicable to each case, researchers made some 
improvements such as adding lags to consider time. Improvements have been made to all 
models. The dynamic version of I/O is an approach that includes lags, while Regional 
Econometric Input-Output Model (REIM) is a continuous time formulation. Due to the 
fact that the CGE approach is not the best choice, because of the static factor, a dynamic 
CGE approach has been also established. When considering time, last but not least is the 
Sequential Interindustry Model (SIM), which is used when the economic indices are 
reported in a quarterly base. By using I/O with the SIM modification, researchers have 
the ability to determine short-run estimation. The SIM approach is the most appropriate 
for short-run estimations, however is not flexible enough. 
Concerning the geographical space it is expected that any kind of disaster will affect 
not only the region where the event takes place but probably the whole country or even 
more (Okuyama, 2007). For that reason, the space dimension should also be taken into 
consideration and one of the most appropriate solutions is to use the Spatial Computable 
General Equilibrium (SCGE) approach. What is also commonly used is the market 
efficiency by Fama (1998) and the Fama and French three-factor model (1993). 
2.3 The empirical findings 
The empirical results of studies on terrorist attacks are quite significant. Hallahan 
et al. (2016), relying on the 11th of September 2001, showed that systematic risk has 
mainly increased due to that attack whereas there was no change due to similar attacks. 
Carter et al. (1998) investigated the terrorist attacks on USA embassies concluding that 
although USA believe terrorist attack is a serious matter, US was not prepared enough in 
order to tackle such a threat of catastrophic terrorism.  
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In terms of religions, Jones (2006) mentioned that all religious terrorists 
emphasize they are tackling an apocalyptic battle with demonic forces. The terrorists’ 
purpose is not only to divide the world into good and evil but also to purify the world. 
The linkage that has been fount between religion and terrorism is the violence of 
sacrificial killing and/or apocalyptic purification. 
In terms of results per system of government, Brynjar and Skjolberg (2000) 
concluded that there is a complex relationship between democracy and terrorism. More 
specifically, they mention that although the democratic countries are a great target for the 
terrorists, the semi-democratic countries or countries in democratic transition are those 
with the most events occurring.  
The main contradiction is made on the level of democracy and wealth. Karolyi 
and Martell (2006) stated that terrorist attacks on richer and more democratic countries 
led to a greater negative market reaction compared to the poorer and less democratic 
ones. Here comes the contradiction by Tavares (2004) who claimed that the democratic 
countries face small market reactions. 
Concerning the education level and based on the findings in Russell and Miller 
(1983), the majority of perpetrators are usually well educated from high-ranking 
universities and probably Masters Degree holders. So, the belief that terrorism is a 
situation caused by uneducated or less educated people cannot be proved from this paper. 
This statement can be well connected to Hamilton and Hamilton (1983) who ended on 
results proving that the further impact is generated to less well-educated countries. On the 
other hand Taylor (1998) mentioned that the social background as well as the educational 
level of the participants cannot be proved to be determinants of a terrorist attack. 
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In terms of the results per developed/ developing countries and based on the 
findings by Russell and Miller (1983) the majority of perpetrators usually come from the 
middle or even the upper classes in the respective nations or areas.  
 
3 Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Data, graphical and statistical presentations  
The database used in our paper contains all terrorist attacks for a time span of 45 
years (1970 – 2014)1 and the events recorded in an intraday base. However, the initial 
dataset does not contain any record for the year 1993. After a great research, no official 
records have found since 2015, so the results do not depict the latest events that took 
place in Asia and Europe.  
The University of Maryland’s dataset includes almost all the important variables 
such as the date and time of the event, the country and city of the attack, the attack and 
the target type as well as the number of fatalities and injuries of each attack. However, we 
have decided to enrich database by including the region2 of each country as well as 
religion3, system of government4, educational level5 and whether the target is a developed 
or developing country.  
After collecting all the relevant variables and in order to extract information about 
the regularity of an event occurring under specific conditions their frequencies were 
calculated. In order words, our aim was to categorize the various events by taking into 
                                                        
1 The source of the main data is the library of University of Maryland, Global Terrorism 
Database: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/  
2 The source of the Regions is the United Nations website revised in 31/10/2013: 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm  
3 The source of the Religion per country is the CIA’s World Fact Book: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2122.html  
4 The source of the System of Government is the CIA’s World Fact Book: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2128.html  
5 The source of the educational level of each country is the literacy indicator by World 
Bank: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.1524.LT.ZS  
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consideration all explanatory variables collected. These results will help us understand 
the main motivations that lead to a terrorist attack occurrence. The final attempt will be to 
mark the most dangerous targets to help investors protect themselves and their portfolios 
from risky investments that can cause great losses due to a terrorist attack. Various maps 
and different kinds of graphs will allow us to visualise these outcomes. 
3.2 Results & Discussion 
 In this section, we will consider the results per continent and region, decade, 
religion, regime, educational level and for developed and developing countries. Map 1 
shows graphically the frequencies per continent of terrorist attacks while Table 1 presents 
the terrorist attacks and the associated fatalities and injuries per continent and region. 
Specifically, in Map 1a we may first see the frequencies of terrorist attacks 
occurred in North America since 1970 where there were only 69 attacks in Canada 
compared with the 2,646 attacks in United States. Moreover, the two other countries that 
belong to North America (Greenland and Bermuda) have no attacks during the whole 
time span.   
As can be seen in Table 1, in North America there are 2,715 terrorist attacks, 
both in the USA and in Canada causing in total 3,861 fatalities and 3,069 injuries. 
Compared to the following findings, it is obvious that all the numbers appear to be low 
for such a crowed, multicultural, and multinational region. In this area an event that 
raised great attention has occurred. This event is the 11th of September terrorist attack that 
force researchers to start taking into consideration terrorism and its perspectives.  
The situation is aggravated in Central and South America where the number of 
the terrorist events reaches the 11,836 attacks in those 45 years, which is almost 4.5 times 
higher than that of North America (Table 1). The huge numbers of fatalities and injured 
people indicate the great leftover of those attacks where the fatalities sum to a total 
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number, which is more than two times higher than injuries (Table 1). Moreover, what is 
obvious in Map 1b is that the main targets are Peru and Colombia, which reach the 6,075 
and 7,942 events respectively. Compared to the North America, Central and South 
America is facing a greater amount of terrorist attacks, however, not that much attention.  
In the European case (Map 1c), terrorist attacks are smoothly spread in the whole 
continent and the United Kingdom is the target where the most events occurred and more 
specifically the total number of events in those 45 years equals to 4,881 attacks. The 
recorded number of fatalities in Europe is much less (almost 1/5) compared to the ones in 
Central and South America but there is not such a great difference between the injured 
people on those two different cases, where Europe reaches a slightly higher number.6 
What is important to mention is that, in the European region we came across with many 
different religions, systems of government, economic and educational levels, which 
makes it a great filed of conflicts due to the diversification. 
When the discussion comes to Asia, the scene changes to the worst-case scenario 
where the terrorist attacks are flourishing and reaching the highest level of terrorist 
attacks worldwide in just one and only country. Iraq is the most smitten target worldwide 
(Map 1d). With 16,023 terrorist attacks in its history, Iraq counts the most killed and 
injured people in its population, 49,760 and 100,997 respectively.  
Even in a continent level, Asia reaches the highest number in all three cases. The 
total number of terrorist attacks is 73,324 causing 167,235 and 289,593 fatalities and 
injuries respectively (Table 1). Other countries been seriously affected are Afghanistan, 
Pakistan and India (Map 1d). The total attacks for those three countries are 7,765, 11,522 
                                                        
6 It has to be emphasized again that since January 2015, there are no yet available officially recorded 
attacks and as result the recent unfortunate events are not mentioned in our paper. If we could include these 
events in the European case then this would have change a lot the map as there is a sharp increase in 
terrorist attacks occurring in Europe this last one and a half year. 
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and 9,069 attacks respectively. Having that in mind, we can figure out the Pakistan is the 
second most smitten country in Asia.  
Compared to Asia, the African continent has suffered less. This may be easily 
justified by the total number of events occurred in Africa, which equals to 16,630, almost 
the same number with the attacks that took place just in Iraq. That is, one Asian country 
has suffered as much as the whole of the African continent. The number of fatalities in 
Africa equals to 68,207 of its population and the injured people are 50,715, giving a ratio 
of 0.5 compared to those in Iraq (Table 1e). The countries affected more in Africa are 
Algeria with 2,704 attacks, Somalia with 2,482 attacks, Nigeria with 2,251 attacks and 
South Africa with 1,969 attacks (Map 1e). 
Oceania is the least affected continent in a worldwide base. The levels of terrorist 
attacks are not comparable to any other as only 239 terrorist events occurred in the whole 
continent over the last 45 years with 144 fatalities and 235 injured people (Table 1). As it 
is obvious in Map 1f, Australia is the most smitten one with just 81 attacks in its history 
since 1970.    
Examining the attacks per region is not enough as maps display the results in an 
aggregated number for the whole time span. What is also important to know is whether 
the events tend to be more often the latest years or if the case seems to follow a normal 
path of attacks. As shown in Figure 1, the first decade was the less harmful with 9,837 
terrorist attacks. The next decade (1980 – 1989) is the worst decade of the history with 
31,165 terrorist events, which gradually decreased in the next 2 decades. However, we 
are currently in the last decade, but still in the half of it (2010 – 2014) and the recorded 
terrorist attacks until now have exceeded all previous records. Considering the latest 
terrorist events since 2015 the current decade is to be expected as the worst.  
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Table 1: Total number of terrorist attacks and associated fatalities and injuries 
Continents and Regions Terrorist attacks Fatalities Injured people 
North America Total 2,715 3,861 3,069 
Central America 10,342 28,923 9,052 
South America 18,453 28,532 16,316 
Central & South America Total 28,795 57,455 25,368 
Eastern Europe 3,319 5,777 9,173 
Northern Europe 5,295 3,619 5,857 
Southern Europe 6,921 2,593 7,914 
Western Europe 4,251 607 3,484 
Europe Total 19,786 12,596 26,428 
Central Asia 253 400 1,332 
Eastern Asia 758 1,000 9,075 
Southern Asia 33,929 78,829 73,467 
South-Eastern Asia 9,313 13,539 22,644 
Western Asia 29,071 73,467 140,297 
Asia Total 73,324 167,235 289,593 
Eastern Africa 4,713 22,900 19,288 
Middle Africa 1,190 8,766 4,715 
Northern Africa 5,665 17,472 15,039 
Southern Africa 2,161 2,918 4,947 
Western Africa 2,901 16,151 6,726 
Africa Total 16,630 68,207 50,715 
Australia & New Zealand 99 18 83 
Melanesia 136 126 129 
Micronesia  0 0 0 
Polynesia 4 0 13 
Oceania Total 239 144 235 
 
Proportionally to the increase of terrorist attacks, there is a steady increase in 
both fatalities and injuries (Figure 1) and as it can be seen the increase in injuries is 
sharper than the increase in fatalities. The cause to that increase may be the advance in 
technology and the fact that everyone can now have access to weapons that may cause 
thousands of fatalities (Tucker, 1999). 
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Map 1: Frequency maps of terrorist attacks per continent 
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Figure 1: Attacks, fatalities and injuries per decade  
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Another driven factor for the terrorist attacks is the differentiation in religions. 
We consider religions as one of the most important factors and thus we examine in detail 
this factor in our analysis. Figure 2 displays religions, which appeared to concentrate a 
great number of events, while Table 2 is a concise presentation of the rest of religions 
with the total number of terrorist attacks, fatalities as well as injuries in each case. 
Muslims seem to be the main target with 47,379 terrorist attacks, which, however, can be 
explained by the fact that it is the highest religion population worldwide.  
The next more targeted religion is the Roman Catholic with 39,875 attacks over 
the last 45 years. Based on Figure 2, Muslim has the greatest number in fatalities, while 
Roman Catholics have the greatest number in injured people. However, what is obvious 
is that the most well known religions are those, which have the most terrorist events as 
well. One reason could be the fact that these religions are spread all over the world in 
contrast with some other religions that are found in specific countries.  
To our knowledge, none of the existing papers has mentioned specific religions 
that raise great attention. What has been done till now is to mention specific groups of 
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religious terrorists. Moreover, what we believe we should mention is that the most 
common and widespread religions are those which faced the greatest fatalities. The 
reason to that may be the high-populated religions compared to the less common ones 
such as Anglican or Ekalesian Niue. 
Figure 2: Attacks per Religion 
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Table 2: Concise table of the rest of religions 
 Attacks Fatalities Wounded People 
Armenian Apostolic 20 31 69 
Evangelical 58 81 109 
Lutheran 103 27 98 
Shintoism 390 47 6972 
Ekalesian Niue 0 0 0 
Seventh Day Adventist 0 0 0 
Anglican 2 0 9 
Animist 57 1202 736 
Zionist 15 2 2 
 
Next, we consider regimes and their effect on terrorism. Some studies argue that 
the system of government can be a determinant on whether a terrorist attack will take 
place or not. As shown in Figure 3a countries with a republic government are more likely 
to face a terrorist attack. Our results do agree with previous results suggesting democracy 
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is the main target of terrorism. However, what we need to have in mind is that most of the 
countries are under the republic conditions so it is not fair enough to compare them with 
the minority which do have monarchy, either absolute or constitutional. 
Russell and Miller (1983) mentioned that the perpetrators are from the middle or 
upper classes. However, they mentioned nothing about the target’s economic status. 
Figure 3b proves that developing countries are the main target of a terrorist attack. The 
reason may be the fact that a developing country is usually a wealthy country in natural 
sources, which cannot be exploited by the locals due to the lack of technology because of 
economic limitations. Instead, the well-developed countries have access to the latest 
technology on both weapons and production process.  
 
Figure 3: Attacks per System of Government (a) and per Developing/Developed Countries (b) 
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Concerning the results per educational level and as we do not analyse perpetrators 
but the victims as a nation, we came across with a database with a great amount of 
missing values. Our main sources were databases of international organizations such as 
the World Bank, IMF and OECD. The limited amount of information has forced us not to 
analyse a dataset with a few observations that may lead to biased results.  
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Finally, Figure 4 presents the results per attack type (4a) and target type (4b) 
pointing out that the main weapon of the terrorists is the bombing and explosion 
procedure (Figure 4a). With the high-level technology, an attack caused by an explosion 
can create a huge impact to both fatalities and properties and is costless compared to 
other attack types. Figure 4b makes it clear once again, that religious fanatic are those 
facing the problem of terrorism. The religious figures and institutions are reaching a huge 
number of attacks, almost half more compared to the exactly next common target, which 
is the military. As a finding, we can conclude that neither the economy nor the education 
can cause such a disaster compared to the religious conflicts all over the world. Many 
crimes have been committed to the world for the God and the last year’s events indicate 
that more events will be added into the list.  
Figure 4: Attacks per attack type and target type  
    
  (a)      (b) 
 
3.3 Discussing the determinants of terrorist attacks 
Now, going back to graphs and maps, we can explore the main determinants of 
terrorist attacks and concentrate to those that appear to be the main triggers to the 
assaulter’s hand. Some may believe that money is what makes the world go around and 
the results of it can be harmful. Others may argue that the lack of education is what 
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makes people to be more aggressive and prone to conflicts. However, what it has been 
proven is that neither the economic nor the educational factors are those, which lead to 
great disasters.  
Religion, and more specifically fanatics, is the most common determinant. This 
comes in line with Jones (2006). Political, economic and linguistic diversification is well 
accepted in the global scheme; however, religious diversification raises a lot of conflict 
with the holy places of worship facing the violence on its pick. Religious terrorists 
support the belief that they are locked in an apocalyptic battle against the demonic forces. 
Considering their religion as the only one that does believe and represents the real God, 
they try to either proselytize others or vanish the other religions. In both cases, the way to 
achieve their goals is painful and bloody assaults.  
The second most common determinant can be the economic perspective of an 
attack. In other words, it is commonly observed that the economically powerful countries, 
which have access to the latest technological equipment, have the tendency to attack to 
the less developed countries that, however, are wealthy in natural resources. The less 
developed countries, due to their lack of technological equipment, are not able to defend 
their natural wealth and at the same time take advantage of it, thus they become the easy 
target of the superpower governments and the multinational companies. This is in line 
with Ojakorotu (2011) while Tavares (2004) and Arin et al. (2008) claim that targets are 
democratic and richer countries.  
The technological advantage is not only responsible for the economically driven 
terrorist attacks, but also for the rapidly increased number of casualties. More 
specifically, the technology grows with the blink of an eye, and nowadays is more 
accessible than ever. Both the high level of technology as well as the quantity of 
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technological equipment gives access to anyone to commit a successful and very likely 
deadly terrorist attack. 
 
4. The effect on economic markets: an event study analysis  
As already mentioned in the literature review, one of the most common 
methodologies used to examine terrorist attacks is the event study analysis introduced by 
MacKinlay (1997). This methodology allows researchers to estimate the abnormal returns 
of similar events and investigate which determinants are those capable to influence 
abnormalities, if any exist. In these lines, we include in our research an event study 
analysis. In order to create the list of events we take into consideration the frequencies 
already presented in Section 3. These results showed that all continents, except Oceania, 
have a great amount of events. So, having that in mind we decided to use as a sample 
events from North, Central and South America, Asia, Africa and Europe. Considering 
fatalities as the main criterion 35 events since 1995 are examined. The list of events is 
presented in Table I in the Appendix.  
Various reasons have driven us to consider events only from the last 20 years. 
Specifically, based on the frequencies discussed in section 3 it was shown that terrorist 
attacks have rapidly increased in these years while at the same time trading nowadays is 
easier than ever before in the past. Moreover, an obstacle we came across is the 
limitations we faced on gathering the data needed. The limitation comes to the time 
range, due to the fact that the source7 we used in order to have access to the price of 
bonds, indices and gold, could not provide the whole dataset on a daily base as required 
by the event study analysis. 
 
                                                        
7 The source of data is the website Investing.com: www.investing.com  
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4.1    The methodology 
  We follow the methodology described in MacKinlay (1997) creating event and 
estimation windows for each event. Figure 5 illustrates both windows with the days’ 
specification. As day zero (0) is mentioned the event day, while a 7-days event will be 
created as a 3-days pre-event and a 3-days post-event observations having as a middle 
observation the day of the event. The estimation window includes 90-days pre-event 
observations and it is used to estimate the coefficient of the economic and market models.  
Figure 5:  Estimation window and event window (Event Study Analysis) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Having created both windows, we calculate the returns required by the economic 
and market models. As economic model, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)8 
formulation is used as presented in equation (1) while the market model’s expression is 
presented in equation (2). That is  
  , , , ,: ( ) ( )A t F t M t F t tCAPM R R R R        (1)  
                   0 1: A M tMarket Model R R u        (2) 
In both approaches, RA stands for Returns of the Asset, with asset in our case being the 
government bonds9; RM corresponds to the Returns of the Market, being the major index 
                                                        
8 Alternatively, the Arbitrage Pricing Model (APM) may be used but due to limitations in availability of 
data in multiple risk factors, we have used the CAPM, despite the questionable validity of the restrictions 
imposed by its specification. Additionally assuming the CAPM holds the constant term is expected to be 
zero (Gujarati, 2003). 
9 The methodology of event study analysis proposes to examine the abnormal returns of stocks. However, 
this paper investigates terrorist attacks that can influence the whole country. For that reason, instead of 
-93 
-4 -3 0 +3 
Event day 
Estimation Window 
 
Event Window 
 
 25 
of each country; and εt, ut the disturbance terms with the usual properties. In the CAPM 
model specification, RF stands for Returns of the Risk-free Asset. The literature proposes 
government bonds when investigating stocks as a risk free asset. However, in our case the 
government bond cannot be treated as a risk free asset because this is the main asset of 
investigation. Based on Barro and Misra (2016) gold can be considered as a risk free 
asset due to the fact that it cannot be used a hedge against macroeconomic declines and 
its expected real rate of return should be close to risk free.  
The expression used to calculate actual returns is the following:  
1
1
Re t t
t
P P
Actual turn
P



      (3) 
where Pt stands for the closing price of period t, while Pt-1 stands for the closing price of 
the previous period.10 
The actual returns calculated for the 90-days estimation window are used in the 
model specifications (equations 1 and 2) from which the coefficients that will be derived 
are going to be used in order to calculate the expected returns in the 7-days event 
window. The same formula used to calculate actual returns of the 90-days estimation 
window will be also used to calculate actual returns in the 7-days event window, while 
the coefficients derived from the CAPM and Market models will be used to estimate the 
expected returns. Equation 4 presents the ways Abnormal Returns have been calculated, 
while Equation 5 presents the final step providing us with the Cumulative Abnormal 
Return. This is the dependent variable we try to model in order to examine whether there 
is a significant abnormal return, negative or positive, or not after a terrorist attack. This 
                                                                                                                                                                             
stocks we have decided to calculate the abnormal returns of government bonds with the possible associated 
limitations.  
 
10 We have also tried First Difference of Logarithms specification, with all results being statistically 
insignificant in all cases. The formula for this specification is:  1 ln lnt tActual Return P P        
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variable will also be explained by a variety of explanatory variables whose significance 
will be taken into consideration.  
     –   Abnormal Return Actual Return Expected Return   (4) 
        
1
   . . .  
n
i
Cumulative Abnormal Return C A R Abnormal Return

  (5) 
The Simple Hypothesis Test is going to provide information about the 
significance of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns. The null hypothesis states that the 
mean value of the variable is insignificant, while the alternative hypothesis states that the 
mean value of the variable is significant. Alternatively, we can say that we examine if 
there is a significant impact on the bond returns due to the terrorist attack or not.  
The final part of the analysis estimates regression models in which Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (C.A.R., Yi in expression 6) is the dependent variable with a number 
of independent variables modeling its behavior like fatalities of each event (Xi)_ and 
various dummy variables (Di) with subscript i representing different characteristics, such 
as the religion (Muslim, Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Buddhist, etc), regimes, credit rating 
and level of development of the country. In this regression model, we have included 
dummies affecting both the constant term and the slope. That is 
1 2 1 2 ( )i i i i i i i iY D X D X v           (6) 
Where vi the disturbance term; α2i are the differential intercepts in the additive form 
distinguishing between intercepts in two characteristics (one belonging in a category and 
one not) while β2i correspond to interactive or multiplicative dummies distinguishing 
between slopes in two characteristics (belonging or not in a category). 
4.2      Empirical results and discussion 
In this section we present and discuss the results derived from the methodology 
described. Table 3 presents the abnormal returns for each event on a 7 days event window 
as well as the cumulative abnormal returns for each of the 35 events with 3 days before  
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Table 3:  Abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns based on CAPM specification and 
for a 7day window 
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 Event 4 Event 5 
Day 
A.R C.A.R A.R C.A.R A.R C.A.R A.R C.A.R A.R C.A.R 
-3 -0.0053 -0.0053 0.0164 0.0164 0.0240 0.0240 -0.0047 -0.0047 -0.0121 -0.0121 
-2 0.0024 -0.0029 0.0000 0.0163 -0.0687 -0.0447 -0.0249 -0.0296 -0.0071 -0.0191 
-1 0.0029 0.0000 0.0121 0.0284 -0.0061 -0.0508 -0.0210 -0.0507 0.0180 -0.0012 
0 -0.0016 -0.0015 0.0314 0.0598 0.0000 -0.0508 0.0000 -0.0507 0.0041 0.0029 
1 -0.0007 -0.0023 0.0055 0.0653 0.0158 -0.0350 -0.0031 -0.0538 -0.0194 -0.0165 
2 -0.0031 -0.0054 0.0058 0.0711 -0.0081 -0.0431 -0.0121 -0.0659 0.0109 -0.0056 
3 -0.0014 -0.0068 0.0107 0.0818 -0.0091 -0.0522 -0.0041 -0.0701 0.0379 0.0323 
 Event 6 Event 7 Event 8 Event 9 Event 10 
 A.R C.A.R A.R C.A.R A.R C.A.R A.R C.A.R A.R C.A.R 
-3 -0.0320 -0.0320 -0.0175 -0.0175 -0.0122 -0.0122 0.0122 0.0122 -0.0179 -0.0179 
-2 0.0204 -0.0116 -0.0080 -0.0255 0.0057 -0.0065 -0.0036 0.0087 0.0146 -0.0033 
-1 -0.0127 -0.0243 -0.0020 -0.0276 0.0031 -0.0034 -0.0088 -0.0001 -0.0163 -0.0196 
0 0.0000 -0.0243 -0.0266 -0.0542 0.0005 -0.0030 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0380 -0.0576 
1 0.0165 -0.0078 -0.0013 -0.0554 -0.0042 -0.0072 -0.0589 -0.0587 -0.0126 -0.0703 
2 0.0073 -0.0004 0.0013 -0.0542 -0.0028 -0.0100 -0.0087 -0.0673 -0.0012 -0.0715 
3 -0.0061 -0.0065 -0.0111 -0.0653 0.0127 0.0027 0.0208 -0.0465 -0.0002 -0.0716 
 Event 11 Event 12 Event 13 Event 14 Event 15 
 A.R C.A.R A.R C.A.R A.R C.A.R A.R C.A.R A.R C.A.R 
-3 -0.9849 -0.9849 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0009 -0.0009 0.0008 0.0008 0.0072 0.0072 
-2 0.0124 -0.9725 -0.0137 -0.0150 0.0016 0.0008 0.0030 0.0038 0.0111 0.0184 
-1 -0.0218 -0.9943 0.0001 -0.0149 -0.0055 -0.0047 -0.0009 0.0029 0.0237 0.0421 
0 -0.0138 -1.0081 -0.0047 -0.0196 0.0038 -0.0009 0.0001 0.0029 -0.1218 -0.0797 
1 0.0046 -1.0034 0.0225 0.0029 -0.0040 -0.0049 -0.0013 0.0016 -0.0056 -0.0852 
2 -0.0250 -1.0284 0.0057 0.0087 -0.0179 -0.0228 -0.0061 -0.0045 0.0009 -0.0844 
3 0.0190 -1.0094 -0.0768 -0.0681 -0.0091 -0.0319 -0.0009 -0.0054 -0.0042 -0.0885 
 Event 16 Event 17 Event 18 Event 19 Event 20 
 A.R C.A.R A.R C.A.R A.R C.A.R A.R C.A.R A.R C.A.R 
-3 0.0059 0.0059 0.0465 0.0465 -0.0108 -0.0108 0.0140 0.0140 -0.0012 -0.0012 
-2 0.0183 0.0242 -0.0568 -0.0103 -0.0001 -0.0109 -0.0187 -0.0046 0.0024 0.0012 
-1 -0.0039 0.0203 0.0633 0.0530 -0.0010 -0.0118 0.0000 -0.0047 0.0043 0.0055 
0 0.0000 0.0203 -0.0429 0.0101 -0.0246 -0.0364 -0.0045 -0.0092 0.0000 0.0055 
1 0.0040 0.0243 0.0486 0.0588 0.0135 -0.0229 -0.0045 -0.0137 -0.0005 0.0050 
2 -0.0061 0.0182 -0.0261 0.0326 0.0039 -0.0190 -0.0493 -0.0629 -0.0072 -0.0021 
3 0.0047 0.0229 0.0030 0.0356 0.0108 -0.0082 -0.0011 -0.0641 0.0006 -0.0015 
 Event 21 Event 22 Event 23 Event 24 Event 25 
 A.R C.A.R A.R C.A.R A.R C.A.R A.R C.A.R A.R C.A.R 
-3 0.0160 0.0160 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0077 -0.0077 0.0053 0.0053 0.0077 0.0077 
-2 -0.0139 0.0021 -0.0026 -0.0036 -0.0099 -0.0176 -0.0032 0.0021 0.0036 0.0113 
-1 0.0031 0.0053 -0.0035 -0.0072 -0.0219 -0.0396 0.0053 0.0073 -0.0005 0.0107 
0 -0.0006 0.0046 -0.0002 -0.0074 0.0061 -0.0335 -0.0122 -0.0048 -0.0112 -0.0004 
1 -0.0005 0.0041 0.0016 -0.0057 0.0197 -0.0137 0.0428 0.0380 -0.0065 -0.0069 
2 -0.0199 -0.0158 -0.0069 -0.0127 0.0001 -0.0137 0.0071 0.0451 0.0038 -0.0031 
3 -0.0019 -0.0176 -0.0072 -0.0199 0.0129 -0.0008 0.0209 0.0660 -0.0035 -0.0066 
 Event 26 Event 27 Event 28 Event 29 Event 30 
 A.R C.A.R A.R C.A.R A.R C.A.R A.R C.A.R A.R C.A.R 
-3 0.0327 0.0327 0.0055 0.0055 0.0057 0.0057 0.0028 0.0028 0.0035 0.0035 
-2 0.0118 0.0445 -0.0207 -0.0152 0.0152 0.0209 -0.0021 0.0007 0.0182 0.0216 
-1 -0.0069 0.0376 -0.0017 -0.0169 -0.0039 0.0170 0.0007 0.0014 0.0094 0.0310 
0 -0.0150 0.0226 0.0324 0.0156 -0.0009 0.0161 -0.0035 -0.0021 0.0002 0.0312 
1 -0.0144 0.0083 0.0116 0.0272 0.0024 0.0185 0.0108 0.0087 0.0140 0.0452 
2 -0.0055 0.0028 -0.0072 0.0200 0.0086 0.0271 0.0041 0.0128 0.0157 0.0609 
3 -0.0113 -0.0085 -0.0150 0.0050 -0.0067 0.0204 0.0002 0.0130 0.0040 0.0649 
 Event 31 Event 32 Event 33 Event 34 Event 35 
 A.R C.A.R A.R C.A.R A.R C.A.R A.R C.A.R A.R C.A.R 
-3 0.0091 0.0091 -0.0066 -0.0066 0.0040 0.0040 -0.0028 -0.0028 0.0008 0.0008 
-2 0.0074 0.0165 -0.0065 -0.0131 -0.0132 -0.0093 0.0017 -0.0011 -0.0025 -0.0017 
-1 -0.0165 0.0000 -0.0165 -0.0296 0.0065 -0.0028 0.0424 0.0413 -0.0157 -0.0174 
0 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0080 -0.0217 0.0124 0.0096 0.0178 0.0590 0.0006 -0.0169 
1 0.0153 0.0152 0.0132 -0.0085 0.0132 0.0229 -0.0299 0.0291 0.0003 -0.0165 
2 0.0047 0.0199 0.0129 0.0044 -0.0106 0.0123 0.0011 0.0303 -0.0096 -0.0261 
3 0.0034 0.0233 0.0070 0.0115 -0.0098 0.0026 0.0068 0.0371 0.0092 -0.0169 
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and after the terrorist attack.11 The aggregation of the abnormal returns is required so that 
we can draw the overall impact of the events included in the analysis. One of the 
assumptions is that one event window is not overlapping with another event window on 
the same market. The absence of overlapped event windows leads to independent 
abnormal returns across the events. 
Regarding event day zero, the day when the terrorist attack occurred, some events 
appear to have zero abnormal returns. This can be justified because either the attack 
occurred after the close of the stock markets or the attack occurred on a day the stock 
markets do not open such as weekends. In these cases, the impact of the attacks will be 
captured in the abnormal return of day one. Such examples could be events three, six, 
sixteen, twenty and thirty-one.  
Table 4 presents the results from the Simple Hypothesis Test for both Cumulative 
Abnormal Return Variables. From Table 4 in both cases the null hypothesis is not 
rejected as P-values are greater than usual levels of significance (α=0.1, 0.05 or 0.01). In 
other words, we cannot reject the null hypothesis, thus we do not know if the events 
cause an impact on the bond returns or not.  
Table 4: Simple Hypothesis Test Results 
Cumulative Abnormal Return t-statistics p-value 
CAPM -1.209411 0.2348 
Market Model -1.0743657 0.2905 
 
Next, we discuss the results from the Cumulative Abnormal Returns regressions. 
Table 5 summarizes the results derived from the regressions, which provide information 
about the determinants of abnormalities. The first column of the table presents the 
independent variables used in the regression as determinants and the second column 
presents the coefficients from the initial CAPM specification. The third column presents 
the coefficients from the CAPM model after omitting the insignificant variables. Finally, 
                                                        
11 Abnormal returns based on the market model and estimations of returns of a 90-days window are not 
presented here but are available on request. 
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the fourth column presents the initial results from the market model specification. Some 
of the variables initially decided to be included, such as credit rating, were omitted due to 
colinearity problems.  
As shown in Table 5, after the initial attempt to determine the coefficient for the 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns calculated with CAPM, we omitted the insignificant 
variables to end up in a more accurate result. The same attempt been tried for the market 
model as well, but the estimation could not be improved by omitting insignificant 
variables.  
Thus, moving forward to the discussion of those results it is important to mention 
that all the models have a high Goodness of Fit as shown by the adjusted R2, which in all 
cases is greater than 95%. This actually means that in all cases the explanatory variables 
can describe more than 95% of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns. Concerning the 
diagnostic tests there is no indication in any of them apart from normality in the case of 
the market model.12 Discussing the determinants, we should mention that as it is proven 
by the frequencies in section 3 the religion is a great determinant in a terrorist attack and 
at the same time appears to be a significant determinant in the abnormal returns as well.  
More specifically Muslim, which had the greatest amount of terrorist attacks, is a 
significant determinant to the abnormalities as well. Regarding the signs of the 
coefficients, a positive sign indicates an increase on the Cumulative Abnormal Return. 
Bringing in mind equation 4, the increase of Abnormal Returns actually indicates the 
increase in the spread between the actual and the expected price, or a decrease otherwise. 
However, this cannot indicate if this increase is a positive or negative abnormality. On 
the other hand, the decrease of the abnormality, a smaller negative sign of the coefficient, 
indicates that the actual price is close to the expected price. Having that in mind, we can 
                                                        
12 For details on diagnostic tests see Halkos (2006, 2011). 
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conclude that the developed countries and the countries with a republic system of 
government appear to have fewer abnormalities when terrorist attacks occur due to the 
negative sign of their coefficients.  
 
Table 5: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (C.A.R.) in CAPM and Market Models 
Variables       C.A.R.   CAPM      C.A.R.  CAPM   C.A.R. Market Model 
Constant 
 
0.154920 
(1.9431) [0.0662 ] 
0.200070 
(2.9859) [0.0066 ] 
0.182157 
(2.8367) [0.0093 ] 
Fatalities 
0.009797 
(1.1632) [0.2584 ] 
-1.67E-05 
(-1.4471) [0.1614] 
-6.53E-06 
(-0.5917) [0.5599 ] 
Protestant 
 
0.058545 
(0.9220) [0.3675 ] 
 
 
 
 
Roman Catholic 
0.204683 
(3.2118) [0.0044 ] 
0.150472 
(3.6159) [0.0015 ] 
0.103923 
(2.6059) [0.0158 ] 
Buddhist 
-0.086692 
(-1.1160) [0.2776 ] 
-0.131558 
(-2.3960) [0.0251] 
-0.159613 
(-3.0333) [0.0059 ] 
Orthodox 
 
-0.100825 
(-1.4522) [0.1620 ] 
-0.148581 
(-2.7618) [0.0111] 
-0.192885 
(-3.7412) [0.0011 ] 
Muslim 
 
-0.134710 
(-1.8716) [0.0760 ] 
-0.181642 
   (-3.170118) [0.0043 ] 
-0.187059 
(-3.4066) [0.0024 ] 
Republic 
 
-0.076472 
(-2.8220) [0.0105 ] 
-0.073866 
(-2.8378) [0.0093 ] 
-0.019333 
(-0.7750) [0.4462 ] 
Developed 
 
-0.141016 
(-2.615) [0.0166 ] 
-0.129068 
(-2.5298) [0.0187 ] 
-0.148506 
(-3.0374) [0.0059 ] 
Fatalities Muslim 
-0.009210 
(-1.0940) [0.2870 ] 
0.000595 
(2.3774) [0.0261 ] 
0.000270 
(1.1270) [0.2714 ] 
Fatalities Orthodox 
-0.009514 
(-1.1296) [0.2720 ] 
0.000299 
(2.6241) [0.0152 ] 
0.000220 
(2.0111) [0.0562 ] 
Fatalities Buddhist 
-0.009786 
(-1.1611) [0.2593 ] 
 
 
 
 
Fatalities Christian 
 
-0.010877 
(-1.3909) [0.1795 ] 
-0.001829 
(-2.0167) [0.0556 ] 
-0.002337 
(-2.6883) [0.0131] 
Fatalities Roman 
Catholic 
-0.044748 
(-5.1138) [0.0001 ] 
-0.034738 
(-21.6906) [0.0000 ] 
-0.029643 
(-19.3140) [0.0000 ] 
Fatalities Protestant 
 
-0.009813 
(-1.1651) [0.2577 ] 
 
 
 
 
Adjusted R2 96.464% 96.715% 95.542% 
Akaike Info  Criterion -3.700444 -3.805767  
Normality 1.1664 [0.5581] 1.0838 [0.5816] 39,884 [0.0000] 
ARCH effect 0.1412 [0.7096] 0.3032 [0.5351] 0.1874 [0.6680] 
Breusch-Pagan 0.1818 [0.8352] 0.0953 [0.9095] 0.2813 [0.7576] 
Ramsey RESET   0.3980 [0.6951] 0.0823 [0.9352] 0.6971 [0.4930] 
t-statistics in parentheses and p-values in brackets 
 
In the case of the CAPM model specification and in analyzing the coefficients, it 
is important to take into consideration both the use of additive and multiplicative 
dummies. More specifically, when an event occurs in a country which major religion is 
Muslim, the effect caused by the Muslim victims to the abnormality equals to 0.018428 
(0.200070-0.181642),  while  the  influence  on the slope of fatalities equals to 0.0005783  
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(-.67E-05+0.000595). In the same way, we can estimate the effects caused when the 
event victims are Roman Catholics or Orthodox. In the case of Orthodox the constant 
term also decreases to 0.051489 (0.200070-0.148581) as in Muslim and the effect on 
slope decreases as well and equals to 0.0002823 (-1.67E-5 + 0.000299).  
On the other hand, the case of Roman Catholics differs from the previous cases, 
where, the constant term is influenced in a way that increases the total effect from 
0.200070 to 0.350542 (0.200070 + 0.150472) and the effect on the slope is higher and 
equals to -0.0347547 compared to -1.67E-05 that is the slope of the fatalities. In some 
cases, the religion dummy can influence only the constant term or the slope and not both 
of them. Such cases are the Buddhist, Republic and Developed variables, which only 
influence the constant term by decreasing it to 0.068512, 0.126204 and 0.071002 
respectively. A variable that influences only the slope of fatalities is the Christian 
religion, which leads to an influence of -0.0018457 when fatalities occur in a Christian 
country. If none of these cases occurs and the religions are different, then the constant 
influence on the Cumulative Abnormal Returns equals to the constant term (0.200070) 
and the influence of the fatalities equals to -1.67E-05.    
To conclude with, the event study analysis has indicated that although we are not 
able to conclude whether the Cumulative Abnormal Return is significant and has an 
impact or not, determinants do exist and can describe the increase or decrease of the 
spread between the Actual and the Expected Return. To our knowledge, it is the first time 
the religions of the victims are included into the analysis and the regressions showed that 
their impact is also significant. Moreover, we have proven that the more democratic and 
developed countries tend to decrease the spread on the returns. 
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5. Conclusions 
The purpose of the paper was to analyze briefly terrorist attacks and their main 
determinants. For this reason, we have used a worldwide dataset since 1970 and tried to 
extract some terrorist determinants and reasoning if any behind. Relying on a statistical 
description and mapping, we have tried to come into conclusions as a first level of a more 
advanced approach. Then in order to explore possible effects on economic markets an 
event study was carried out. Most of our empirical ascertainments are in line with 
previous researches.  
Overall, based only on statistical findings, we proved that the main reason of a 
terrorist event is religion. Moreover, the level of diversification, such as in the European 
case, can cause great conflicts. In particular, religions and especially fanatics is the most 
common determinant followed by the economic perspective of an attack. We have shown 
that the more democratic and developed countries are inclined to decrease the spread on 
the returns and have found the perspective of the market reaction due to those events. 
Supplementary research requires an extension on the time span when feasible. 
More specifically, we would like to include into the sample the events of 2015–2016, 
which have raised a lot of attention from all over the world, but they have not been 
included into the databases yet. Another improvement will be to search for other relative 
explanatory variables available in a daily frequency to receive a more spherical result of 
each situation. This will be strengthening by the use of the appropriate bond indexes 
instead of major indexes used here due to our limited access to historical data. Finally, 
the examination of individual firms and sectors suffered from the terrorist attacks and the 
consideration of their stock market values before and after the terrorist events may help 
us to infer further on this matter.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Table I:  List of Events 
Date Continent Country 
Government 
Bond 
Index Fatalities 
19/4/1995 America USA 30 years Nasdaq 168 
17/3/1997 Europe Belgium 20 years BEL 20 4 
11/9/2001 America USA 30 years Nasdaq 2952 
17/3/2007 America Mexico 10 years IPC 10 
6/3/2008 Asia Israel 10 years TA 25 9 
5/7/2009 Asia China 20 years CTSP300 184 
29/3/2010 Europe Russia 15 years MICEX 40 
9/9/2010 Europe Russia 15 years MICEX 18 
18/8/2011 Asia Israel 10 years TA 25 5 
22/8/2012 Asia Turkey 5 years BIST 100 21 
31/1/2013 America Mexico 10 years IPC 37 
11/5/2013 Asia Turkey 5 years BIST 100 53 
19/8/2013 Africa Egypt 10 years EGX 30 25 
21/9/2013 Africa Kenya 10 years NSE 20 72 
20/11/2013 Africa Egypt 10 years EGX 30 11 
29/12/2013 Europe Russia 15 years MICEX 36 
16/5/2014 Africa Kenya 10 years NSE 20 48 
22/5/2014 Asia China 20 years CTSP300 36 
23/5/2014 Europe Ukraine 2 years PTFS 20 
14/6/2014 Europe Ukraine 2 years PTFS 49 
23/6/2014 Africa Egypt 10 years EGX 30 22 
4/7/2014 Asia Saudi Arabia 1 year TASI 6 
8/7/2014 Asia Israel 10 years TA 25 5 
17/7/2014 Europe Ukraine 2 years PTFS 298 
28/7/2014 Asia China 20 years CTSP300 96 
28/7/2014 Asia Israel 10 years TA 25 6 
31/7/2014 Asia Israel 10 years TA 25 5 
5/8/2014 Africa Egypt 10 years EGX 30 22 
31/8/2014 Europe Ukraine 2 years PTFS 87 
24/10/2014 Africa Egypt 10 years EGX 30 34 
3/11/2014 Asia Saudi Arabia 1 year TASI 7 
6/11/2014 Europe Ukraine 2 years PTFS 201 
13/11/2014 Europe Ukraine 2 years PTFS 20 
18/11/2014 Asia Israel 10 years TA 25 7 
16/12/2014 Asia Pakistan 30 years FTSE 157 
 
